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1. Introduction  
 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) translate the principle of labour division in an international or 
global scale. The idea behind the concept, the breakup of production in several stages, one at 
least taking place in a different country, has gained steam in the last decades due to an ever-
increasing fragmentation of production stirred by the advances in transportation, Information 
and Communication Technologies and in services in general. Likewise, multinationals play a 
vital role in GVCs with the outsourcing of their production to third countries. 
The literature on GVCs is already extensive and follows two different lines: (i) the 
impacts for GVC-participating countries and (ii) the appropriate measurement of GVC 
participation. The former includes a vast range of case studies and generic empirical models 
on the economic spill-overs of GVC participation, either technological (Brach and Kappel, 
2009) or in productivity (Baldwin and Yan, 2014), knowledge diffusion (Saliola and Zanfei, 
2009) or foreign direct investment (Martinez-Galán and Fontoura, 2018). A wide range of 
references focuses on the impacts of GVC participation in development, especially for 
countries in the later stages of development. The argument is usually that, before, developing 
countries had to build a whole production chain by themselves, whereas now they can 
specialize in a particular stage of the manufacturing process (Taglioni & Winkler, 2016). The 
latter –more methodological- is based on the premise that, by not accounting for the import 
content of a country’s exports, traditional trade statistics do not fully capture the fragmentation 
of international production and are responsible for double-counting in import and export data. 
To fill this gap, a handful of internationally linked Input-Ouput (IO) datasets have emerged. 
Their focus is in supply-use relationships, highlighting their use as production intermediates or 
final demand rather than simply working with a commodity or service classification.  
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The World Input-Ouput Database (WIOD) is often used by researchers; its second, 
2016 release included data for 43 countries and 56 sectors, an enhancement from the first one 
(2013), with data for 40 countries and 35 sectors. It covers 85% of the world trade and allows 
the study of the impacts of the international fragmentation of production in environmental and 
socio-economic issues. As described by Timmer et al. (2016), national IO tables are combined 
with bilateral international trade statistics to disagreggate the imports by country of origin and 
use category, to generate an international supply and use table. It is important to note that the 
methodology produces IO tables that are estimates rather than a precise measurement.  
Since Hummels et al. (2001)’s seminal attempt that introduced the concept of Vertical 
Specialization (VS), to the emergence of trade in value added (TiVA), to Koopman et al. (2011 
and 2014), who attempted to refine and bring together previous measures, several authors, 
departing from IO tables, have provided empirical evidence about the changes of international 
trade due to the international interdependences in production processes.  
In the same way as the research on GVCs, use of network analysis methods with input-
output trade data is recent and will certainly experience further developments. Authors 
employing network analysis to date reinforce its potentialities to understand trade in value 
added. Some argue that the complexity of the measures in network theory and the ability to 
build models that incorporate these features are powerful tools to understand GVCs, Amador 
and Cabral (2015); others that network analysis enables to grasp the heterogeneity of different 
actors and trade links in GVCs (Santoni and Taglioni, 2015) and that network-based measures 
can be correlated to external factors such as the presence of multinational groups, Altomonte 
et al. (2015).  
The present work applies such methods to characterize the evolution of the world’s 
trade in value-added (TiVA) between 2000 and 2014. It uses data from the latest release of the 
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WIOD to build representations suitable for graph visualisation and the computation of network 
parameters.  
The paper organises as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the methodology used for the 
graph visualisation and analysis, as node and eigenvector centrality, and the use of filters for 
unveiling the backbone of the flows. Section 3 presents a rather comprehensive review of the 
available literature, highlighting the advantages of network analysis for a better understanding 
of the nature and topology of world trade and production systems. Section 4 describes the two 
basic graphs and their related descriptive statistics, to analyse the world trade in value-added 
in 2000 and in 2014. In section 5, we identify patterns by computing and comparing several 
parameters and indicators. The most robust flows, making for the roots of the GVCs dynamics, 
are also uncovered. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Networks of trade in value-added – a brief comment on the tools and statistics used. 
 
Graph theory is a widely recognized field in mathematics, the subsequent network analysis was 
developed in different areas and adopted as a methodology by social sciences due to its 
potentialities in assessing social phenomena. In the field of economics, several international 
economists –e.g. Benedictis and Tajoli (2011)- and econophysicists –e.g. Kali and Reyes 
(2007) and Serrano et al. (2007)- have advocated the potential of the social network analysis 
methodology to the analysis and visualisation of world trade.  
Indeed, according to Benedictis and Tajoli (2011), trade flows between countries can 
be naturally represented by a straight line (trade flows) connecting two points (countries): a 
network structure or visualisation consisting of a set of points, called nodes or vertices, with 
connections between them, called edges or links.  
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It is possible to add complexity to the nodes or edges by weighting them. A directed 
network fully captures the direction of flows, while nodes can be weighted to highlight the 
importance of specific countries, in line with what Serrano and Boguñá (2003) call a perfect 
example of a real-world network that illustrates competitive relationships. All this plays an 
important role in the analysis of the so-called World Trade Network (WTN), International 
Trade Network (ITN) or World Trade Web (WTW); it is also intuitive, as the amount of trade 
between a pair of countries (usually measured in monetary values of imports and/or exports) is 
treated as the link weight (Bhattacharya et al., 2008), thus reflecting the different magnitudes 
of bilateral trade relationships.  
Based on the idea that an IO matrix is associated to a weighted directed network, a 
relatively recent body of literature has applied network analysis in the study of GVCs, with the 
purpose of locating a country or a country-sector in the world production networks, or to 
explore interdependencies within them.  
In the networks built in this paper, nodes represent countries and are weighted by their 
total trade in value-added (TTVA), bigger diameters representing higher TTVA values. The 
edges or links are weighted according to the size of the bilateral value-added trade flows, with 
greater thickness accounting for higher flows; they are coloured accordingly, with dark grey 
indicating the 10% highest flows. With the nodes weighted by TTVA and the edges connecting 
to the suppliers and users of value added it is possible to break out a country TTVA, getting a 
sense of the world suppliers and users and, more specifically, how domestic and foreign value-
added (DVA and FVA, respectively) split in the world’s economy.   
As the networks are directed, they allow the visualisation of the trajectory of bilateral 
value-added flows (with arrows pointing to the destination, user country). Two important 
concepts are associated with this visualisation: the indegree, referring to the number of 
incoming edges (user country), and the outdegree, referring to the number of outgoing edges 
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(supplier country). Weighted networks permit the analysis of node strengtht which, for directed 
networks, also divides into indegree and outdegree strength.  
The computation of network-based measures of connectivity and centrality is crucial, 
as they allow the identification of connection partners and of key hubs inside the network. 
There is a wide range of such measures in network analysis whose formulas vary in presence 
of a weighted/unweighted network. Barabási (2016) is a standard reference to them and many 
related concepts that will be either mentioned or used here. 
Supposing a TiVA network of countries, connectedness includes Node Degree (ND) –
the number of a country’s trade partners- and Node Strength (NS) -the value or intensity of a 
country’s trade relationship. In directed networks these measures divide into indegree and 
outdegree. NS and ND are often referred to as Node Centrality in the literature, though 
centrality includes a wide range of measures depending whether only first order, one-step links 
are counted (closeness, betweenness) or also secondary, more remote links are considered (e.g. 
eigenvector centrality, as explained below).  
A few fundamental identities apply in our weighted and directed networks: (i) NS is 
equal to a countries’ TTVA, (ii) indegree strenght is equal to a countries’ FVA and (iii) 
outdegree strenght is equal to a countries’ DVA. 
The most important centrality parameter involving secondary or indirect links is the 
eigenvector index. NS and ND, also centrality measures, only capture straight links and neglect 
indirect linkages. In order to fully understand a country’s role in the users and suppliers’ 
network, eigenvector centrality is a finer node-related measure: the rationale behind it is that 
nearby high-scoring nodes contribute to the score of the node in question. The measure thus 
contemplates further, multiple-steps away linkages, differing from other centrality indexes, as 
closeness or betweenness, which disregard the non-adjacent neighbours’ score. Based on 
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Bonacich (1987), the Eigenvector Centrality Index for all the nodes in our networks is 
calculated, in this paper, by Tang et al. (2015)’s formula. 
Kali and Reyes (2007) stress another feature of network visualisation: the possibility of 
adding a threshold that not only allows for a clearer visualisation but also revealing the 
backbone structure of world’s trade. To arrive at a basic structure for the WTN, links or flows 
were progressively eliminated according to a sequence of minimal thresholds. This eventually 
produced a new set of highly informative graphs, from the same original ones, showing the 
backbone of the world’s GVC mesh. 
 
3. World Trade Networks – analysis with traditional trade statistics and IO matrices. 
 
In a seminal work, Snyder and Kick (1979) studied the world’s system theory by presenting a 
bloc-model network analysis for four types of international interactions, including trade flows, 
circa 1965. Their analysis corroborated the theory by finding the presence of three different 
areas: Core (Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan), Semi periphery (some 
Latin American countries, Eastern Europe and some Asian countries) and Periphery (most of 
the Asian continent and all Africa). In terms of interactions, they found that every bloc has 
more trade linkages with the core than with any other.  
Smith and White (1992) elaborated on the previous analysis by focusing solely on world 
trade; they included three time points (1965, 1970 and 1980) and used trade data aggregated in 
15 types of commodities. The inclusion of the three years allowed for a reported stability over 
time and evidences of more upward than downwards mobility; the disaggregation of trade data 
enabled different conclusions for different sectors. For instance, they found that exports of high 
technology manufacturing goods flow primarily within the core and from the core to the other 
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blocs. The inverse is true for agricultural products where international trade is more likely to 
happen from the periphery to the core.  
Mahutga (2006) updated Smith and White (1992)’s results using the same 15 
commodity types and adding the 1990 and 2000 years. The hierarchical nature of the world 
system remained stable from 1965 to 2000, both in terms of core/periphery patterns and of 
production processes; the most noticeable change was the rise of labour-intensive 
manufacturing in non-core zones such as Eastern Europe and the so-called Asian tigers.   
Reyes et al. (2009) disaggregated trade data into four classes: raw materials, 
intermediate, final and capital goods. Their network analysis aimed at enriching the exploratory 
literature about the rising BRIICS performance in the world system. For 1995, 2000 and 2005, 
they found an ever-increasing role for them, in all the indicators’ percentile rankings they 
computed. The centrality index suggested that the BRIICS (with the exception of Indonesia) 
were highly integrated in the WTN, though the increase in the level of integration bears some 
differences among countries and product types. The analyses of node strength, node degree and 
clustering suggest that these results are explained by multiple factors, from the establishing of 
new trade partners to the involvement in trade clubs, following the diminishing role of the rich 
club, and the overall intensification of existing trade relationships. 
Papers with a more exploratory character have also reached important conclusions upon 
the best way of representing world trade in a network. Focus here shifts from the hierarchical 
position of countries within the WTN to the correlation between network-based measures to 
explore the properties of world trade. 
Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2005) broke from previous studies focusing on a single or a 
few snapshots of the WTW and addressed it as a directed and evolving network from 1950 to 
1996. By correlating three topological properties, they concluded that there is a negative 
correlation between average nearest neighbour and degree distribution, which means that 
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countries with many trade partners are on average connected to countries with few partners. A 
decreasing trend between clustering coefficient and degree distribution signalled that partners 
of well-connected countries are less interconnected than partners of poorly connected countries 
(disassortative network). 
Fagiolo et al. (2008) challenged the topological properties of the WTW found in 
previous studies, including that of Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2005). They argued that the 
binary approach to the world trade network is not accurate as it treats every trade link as 
homogeneous regardless of its actual value and used a weighted approach instead. They 
concluded that, for weighted networks, the disassortativeness is not statistically significant: 
well-connected countries are associated with higher clustering coefficients, which confirms the 
existence of trade clubs.  
Serrano et al. (2007) built and analysed the world network of trading imbalances. In 
their network, the links represented the difference between exports and imports and were 
weighted by the magnitude of that difference. By applying a local heterogeneity analysis, the 
authors obtained the backbone of the WTN for 1960 and 2000: the links that carry the biggest 
proportion of a country’s inflow or outflow. They have taken a first step into the study of GVCs 
using traditional trade data, by considering that producer and consumer countries do not absorb 
completely the incoming or outcoming fluxes. By conducting a dollar experiment for the two 
major source countries and two major sink countries, they clearly distinguished between the 
percentage of net dollars that goes into bilateral trade and the allocation of these net dollars in 
the world system. For instance, they found that for each net dollar the US injects into the system 
only 9.3% is retained in China although the direct connection imbalance between the two 
countries is 16.7%. 
The literature applying network analysis to GVCs has addressed, till now, two major 
issues: (i) the analysis of countries’ and country-sector’s positioning and (ii) propagation of 
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economic shocks along the world production network. The former applies network-based 
measures to derive its conclusions and the latter complements the study by correlating these 
measures with external factors that enable conclusions about which countries or sectors are 
most vulnerable to the persistence and/or propagation of economic shocks. 
Amador and Cabral (2015), using WIOD data for 40 countries together with basic 
network visualization tools, described the characteristics of GVCs, in 1995 and 2011, 
represented by bilateral flows of FVA. They focused mainly in individual countries’ centrality, 
finding that bigger countries tend to have higher order nodes and appear “in the centre of the 
network” as suppliers of value added. In terms of evolution, in 1995, mainly Western European 
countries and the US were in the core, whereas Asian countries lay in the periphery. By 2011, 
a few core countries (UK and France) partially lost their position but the US and Germany kept 
theirs; China joined the centre as the most important supplier of value-added. The authors built 
the world’s networks for manufacturing and services to conclude that the density of the 
manufacturing one was much higher than that of the services network: nations are more 
interconnected in the trade of manufacturing goods.   
Focusing on country-sectors rather than solely on individual countries, Santoni and 
Taglioni (2015) computed the network of intra-sectoral trade for the automotive sector (buyers 
and suppliers) and the TiVA network for country-sectors in 2009. The increasing centrality of 
emerging countries was most prominent in the demand side rather than in the supply side, in 
technology intensive GVCs; US industries were still at the core of the global trade network, 
alongside German business services, Chinese retail and Russian mining.  
Cerina et al. (2015) configure the world trade system as a network where the nodes are 
the different industries in different countries for 1995 and 2011, including self-loops that 
represent intra-industry national trade. They found that the trade network is denser inside the 
same economy than in-between economies: a great part of the economic transactions still 
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occurs within national borders and contains many self-loops (high number of industries self-
feeding themselves). At the regional level, through a community-detection test that compares 
their network with a null of a random graph not expected to have a community structure, they 
concluded that “global production” is still operated nationally or, at best, regionally, given that 
the detected communities are individual economies or well-defined geographical regions (e.g. 
NAFTA countries).  
Criscuolo and Timmis (2018) applied a variant of the Bonacich-Katz eigenvector 
centrality to OECD ICIO data, obtaining metrics based on forward and backward linkages. 
They stated that the existence of multiple linkages should be taken into consideration, as it is a 
real-world feature, where service linkages are needed at several stages of the production 
process. They identified profound changes in the structure of GVCs along 1995-2011: whilst 
some activities remained clustered around the same key hubs as in the start of the period, for 
others there had been dramatic relocations (e.g. manufacturing of computer and electronic 
sector). At the country-level, significant evolution took place around three main regions: 
Factory Europe, Factory Asia and Factory America; with the consolidation of Germany and 
the US as central hubs in their respective regions and the diminishing role of Japan as a key 
hub in Asia, where China now played a central role.  
Carvalho (2014) argued that the structure of production networks is crucial in 
determining whether and how microeconomic shocks (affecting only a particular firm or 
technology along the chain) propagate through the economy, as such networks expose critical 
nodes in the chains. This is particularly evident when a small number of central hubs supply 
inputs to many different firms or sectors. Using also network analysis to assess propagation of 
economic shocks along production networks, Blochl et al. (2011) computed two measures of 
centrality: random walk and counting-betweenness centrality. The former is important to reveal 
the vertices instantaneously affected by a shock and the latter to reveal where a shock carries 
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on longer. They computed the hierarchical clustering of the nodes’ rankings in the network to 
find that countries with similar levels of development tend to group together.  
Finally, taking on the poor economic theory character of the previous studies, Contreras 
and Fagiolo (2014) proposed a diffusion model that took into consideration the origin of the 
shock, its impact on IO linkages and the possibility that after the shock hits a certain sector, 
production levels adjust.  
 
4. The world users and suppliers’ network, 2000 and 2014. 
 
We combine TTVA per country with computed bilateral TiVA flows to build and visualise the 
world’s users and suppliers network. Two elements are fundamental in the network: the nodes, 
the 43 countries available in the WIOD, and the edges, the bilateral trade in value-added flows 
amongst the nodes, for 2000 and 2014. Even though the WIOD includes the RoW, it has been 
excluded from the visualisation and further network-based calculations because, as an 
aggregate of economies, it would profoundly influence the nodes and edges weights, since it 
embodies a disproportionate number of economies for which TiVA data is not specified.  
Figures I and II represent the world’s suppliers and users network for 2000 and 2014, 
respectively, with countries roughly displayed according to their geographic location. To 
facilitate visual insights without blurring the most relevant flows and not excluding any of the 
43 countries, a threshold has been defined: only those flows accounting for at least 1% of user 
or supplier countries’ exports appear. Analyses and calculations will be conducted using this 
resulting graph.  
 




From the figures one can see that the number of flows above the threshold has increased 
over time: the network has become slightly denser. Density is the ratio between the total 
number of links and the maximum possible one, ranging from 0 to 1. In both figures, were it 
not for the threshold, the networks would have a total density of 1, as in the original IO tables 
all countries have flows with each other. As focus here is only on the most relevant flows, the 
density goes from 0,39, in 2000, to 0,40 in 2014. 
A broad pattern is common to both figures: three clear groups, North America, a EU 
cluster and a more sparse Asian one, with Indonesia and India further apart, and four 
“individualities” or “oddities”, Brazil, Turkey, Russia and Australia. In the denser but also 
more concentrated 2014 network, Turkey gets closer to the EU and Australia to Asia. The 
Asian cluster becomes somewhat tighter, as India and Indonesia move closer to the other 
countries in it.  
Table I, below confirms that flows at least 1% of the supplier or users TTVA have 
slightly grown from 2000 to 2014; this is also true for the total TTVA which has more than 
trebled.  
 
                               Insert Table 1 here 
 
Both mean and median values are low and close to the lowest bilateral flow; the 
distribution of bilateral TiVA flows is left-skewed, as shown by a mean higher than the median. 
The left bias of the distribution is further supported by the trade flows intensities displayed in 
Table I, where a small number of flows accounts for most of total TTVA flows. The results 
differ however slightly from 2000 and 2014. In 2000, only 17 countries made up 50% of the 
world’s TTVA and, in 2014, more than half of the countries (23) under analysis accounted for 
half of the world TTVA. Over time, there is an increase in participation in production networks. 
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In spite of this, a small number of countries still does not have a substantial place in the global 
production networks, as 34 and 35, out of the 43 countries at stake, made for 90% of the TTVA 
in 2000 and 2014, respectively. 
 
5. Network Analysis.  
 
Visualisation and descriptive statistics  
From Figure I, in 2000, the bilateral flow with the highest value was by far the one from Canada 
to the US with the opposite flow in the second position. “Factory America” is clearly dominated 
by the US, which is not only the country with the biggest node, but also accounts for the thickest 
intra and inter regional flows; most of the flows to and from the US are also coloured with dark 
grey, which means that in 2000 they belonged either to the 10% highest flows or to the top 10 
highest ones. 
Other noticeable flows are those between the US and Japan. Japan was, in 2000, the 
country with the highest TTVA in “Factory Asia”, as well as the centre of intra regional flows. 
However, Japan’s centrality within Factory Asia was not as visually evident as the US one in 
Factory America, other Asian countries such as China, South Korea and Taiwan already 
exhibited strong positions within the region. The thickest intra-regional flows were the bilateral 
ones between South Korea and Japan.  
As for “Factory Europe”, Germany is the country with the highest TTVA, though other 
West European economies are relevant players as well. The highest intra-regional flows were 
those among Western European countries; inter-regional flows to the US (e.g. UK - US) are 
among the top 10 highest flows. 
In 2014, the flow from Canada to the US remains the highest one and the second 
position still belongs to the opposite flow. The US still is the country with the highest TTVA 
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in Factory America and bears the highest intra and inter-regional flows. Factory Asia 
underwent the biggest changes during the period; not only the central position shifted from 
Japan to China, but also the density of intra and inter regional trade has increased substantially, 
displaying darker and thicker links.  
In Factory Europe, Germany continues to be the country that accounts for the highest 
TTVA, though one clearly sees that trade intensity has also increased within the region with 
more participation from Eastern European countries, whose flows are mainly to and from 
Germany. Conversely, the flows between the region and the US have comparatively lost 
relevance within the world flows (they have thus lost their dark grey tonality), as they no longer 
figure amongst the top 10.  
The outward flow from China to the US is higher than the opposite flow, meaning that 
China is a net supplier of value added to the US, contradicting the theory that the US does not 
have a trade in value added imbalance with China. 
 
Node and Eigenvector Centrality  
The users and suppliers networks exhibit a strong correlation between ND and NS (≈0.75) for 
both periods, meaning that countries with a higher number of partners have higher TTVA 
values. The correlation of both indegree and outdegree strength tell us that there is an almost 
perfect relationship (r>0.95) within countries from the upstream to the downstream margins of 
GVCs: great suppliers tend also to be great users of value added. 
The distributions of ND in Figure III confirm that it is highly left-skewed, with most of 
the countries, in 2000 and 2014, having between 15 and 45 (out of 84) partners for both inward 
and outward flows; no bimodality is present. They are even more left-skewed when values are 




                            Insert figures III and IV here  
 
Most of the countries in the network hold weak TiVA relationships, with only few 
accounting for high values. The middle classes are empty or bear low frequencies in both 
periods, which reinforces the uneven distribution of the production chains. Nevertheless, in 
2014, there are a little more countries in the higher classes than in 2000.  
Table II lists the countries with the highest and lowest shares of indegree and outdegree 
strength. As the above correlation between both indicators would predict, the top countries for 
indegree strength are almost the same as the top five ones for outdegree strength. This applies 
for both periods considered and also for the bottom five countries. 
 
                                    Insert Table 2 here 
 
The ranking of nodes, in terms of strength, shows that smaller countries tend to have 
lower positions1. Table II confirms this, with the exception of Bulgaria that has noticeably 
moved out of the bottom five from 2000 to 2014, nearly the same four small European countries 
share the bottom positions in both periods, together with also small entrants like Malta.  
However, the top five positions are shared between big and medium economies.  
The US is the country with the highest inward and outward flows for both periods 
considered. Few has changed in those 15 years, with the noticeable and well documented rise 
of China as a supplier and user of value added in detriment to Japan which has lost its position 
in the top 5 countries with the highest DVA and FVA. China has entered directly to the third 
position in both years, surpassing European countries as the UK and France. France actually 
                                               




lost in 2014 the fourth position in terms of indegree strength to another relevant supplier of 
value added, the Netherlands, In Figure II it is possible to see that the arrow from this country 
to Germany is within the top 10 highest TiVA flows. 
The distributions of Eigenvector Centrality are, once again, left-skewed, meaning that 
most of the countries do not hold significant supply-use relationships (Figure V). The tendency 
has been constant in both periods considered, with a slight overall increase in the middle classes 
in 2014.  
 
                                        Insert Figure V here  
 
Table III displays the correlation between node and eigenvector centrality. They are all 
positive, which means that more and more intense direct supply-use relationships contribute to 
a more central position within the network. An interesting aspect is that the correlation with 
NS is much higher than that with ND, emphasizing the character of this measure that plays 
down the number of partners in favour of their importance within the network.  
 
                                              Insert Table 3 here  
 
Countries such as Canada and Mexico have a low number of partners but are strongly 
connected to the US, which has a high centrality; thus, they also account for a high Eigenvector 
Centrality. The opposite occurs in countries such as Belgium and Italy, with a relatively high 
number of trade partners only moderately central within the network. The percentile rank 
analysis summed up in Table IV displays the same top and bottom countries as in the related 




                                Insert Table 4 here 
 
One noticeable difference between the NS ranking and that of the Eigenvector 
Centrality Index is that Canada is now in the second position, due to its connection to the US. 
China has got the fourth position in 2014, meaning that the country is well established in the 
supply-use networks; however, comparison with its NS third position, suggests that China’s 
relevance is bigger when the intensities of the flows with its direct partners are taken into 
consideration. Another significant change is the entrance of the Netherlands to the fifth 
position: from NS analysis, we can see that this centrality is mostly due to its upstream position 
in the production chain as it accounts for a higher outdegree than indegree centrality. At the 
same time, the strong tie with Germany also contributes to this high rank.  
Nearly the same small European countries occupy the bottom positions, in parallel to 
the results of the NS percentile analysis. Once again, the importance of size is stressed out; 
furthermore, Malta’s and Cyprus’ small dimension, combined with their insular position, has 
an effect of increasing freight rates due to distance between main trading partners and the small 
size of individual shipments, World Bank (2017). 
It is enlightening to compare the top and bottom economies in Table IV, showing how 
the two parameters convey similar information. Moreover, an extended look at the full NS and 
Eigenvector Centrality rankings -not shown here- allows conclusions for countries outside the 
top and bottom positions. Almost all emerging economies have increased their centrality in 
GVCs. Indonesia and India are noteworthy evolutions; both are improving their positioning as 
suppliers of value added. Russia has impressively progressed both as a supplier and importer 
of value-added. Turkey is also gaining momentum in the international GVC scene, but still lags 




Root GVC Patterns for 2000 and 2014   
To identify root or backbone patterns, a threshold that only allows the visualisation of flows 
above the 90th percentile was used. Figures VI and VII represent the 10 % most robust flows 
of the world’s user and supplier’s network for 2000 and 2014, respectively.  
 
                                            Insert Figures VI and VII here  
 
Comparing both networks, one sees that in 2014 there is a greater number of relevant 
flows, as well as more countries. Russia, India, Luxembourg, Czech Republic and Brazil enter 
this more restricted trade scene, while Indonesia has lost relative importance as a supplier of 
intermediates to Japan, and Sweden as a consumer of German intermediates.  
In both periods, most of the flows above the threshold make for bilateral ones between 
a country and its partner. Geography also plays a role: in 2000, 38% of the most relevant flows 
were between countries that share territorial borders; in 2014 this increased to more than 40%. 
The analysis can be enriched by aggregating nodes and flows in the world’s big 
production regions, Factories Asia, Europe and North America, as shown in Figures VIII and 
IX.  
 
                            Insert Figures VIII and IX here  
 
Most of the global production activities still take place within regions, as seen from the 
width of the regional self-loops. This is nevertheless slightly decreasing in all regions but Asia, 
where the share of intra-regional trade in value added has gone from 34% to 36%.  
Noticeably, the share of Asian TTVA with North America has lost relative importance, 
from 38% to 26%. Various factors can help explain this: not only intra-Asian TTVA has 
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increased but also Asia (mostly China) has deepened its ties with Europe and emerging 
economies as Russia and Brazil.  
The figures also show a decrease in the share of European TTVA with North America. 
The importance of intra-European trade in intermediates is more evident than in the other two 
regions. In fact, the share of the European TTVA is well above 60% in both periods and it has 
only slightly decreased from 66% to 65%.  
Western European countries are mostly suppliers of value added to their European 
counterparts. From 2000 to 2014, only the UK has switched from a net supplier to a net user 
of value added for the countries that integrate the 10% most relevant flows. The country holds 
a steady trade link with Norway, mainly due to its imports of primary commodities. Ireland 
and Luxembourg are importers of value added from the UK, mainly services, what is consistent 
with the role of Luxembourg as a financial centre and that of Ireland as a location for 
headquarters of multinational corporations. Ireland also maintains a strong tie with the US; 
France remains essentially European in its production networks, with a somewhat robust input 
link with North America.  
Germany, as previously stated, remains at the core of Factory Europe, and holds the 
most relevant inter-regional production relations with the US and China, being, in both cases, 
a net supplier of value-added. It is also responsible for the presence of Poland in the 10% most 
relevant flows in 2000 and 2014. as well as the Czech Republic’s emergence in 2014. These 
countries’ trade with Germany significantly supplies medium-technology intermediates to the 
chemical and automotive industries. According to the World Bank’s 2017 GVC report, each 
national industry specializes in different tasks along the automotive production chain; the 
Czech in medium-low technology inputs and the Polish in medium-high ones. Germany 
maintained important supply and use relationships with bordering countries such as 
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Switzerland, besides with Austria, Belgium and mostly with the Netherlands, one of its net 
suppliers.  
Russia has emerged in the global production scene at the upstream margin of GVC, 
something typical for countries that specialize in primary commodities. The country’s most 
valuable exports go to China and Germany, the latter also an important supplier of value added 
to Russia.  
Factory Asia has not only been intensifying its internal production links as experiencing 
rapid transformation, with China seemingly adopting the model of its Asian neighbours that 
have entered the GVCs in the final stages of the manufacturing process. South Korea, a former 
major player in Japanese production chains, is now home to multinationals in the field of 
electronics (Samsung, LG) but also in the automotive sector (KIA, Hyundai). It still holds large 
TTVA links with Japan but has evolved as a crucial supplier and user of China’s inputs. This 
model is the core of intra-Asian production chains and helps explaining why China has become 
a supplier of value added to India.  
In 2014, 9% of Asia’s TTVA was with Australia, a country profoundly integrated in 
the Asian production processes. In 2000, it was already an important supplier of production 
inputs to Japan; in 2014, the link is still strong but a new one with China has surpassed it. 
The most relevant ties within NAFTA are centred around the US. Mexico has been 
gradually increasing its role as a supplier of value added to the US, especially in the automotive 
sector. It has even supplanted Canada as the main provider of automotive components to the 
US, World Bank (2017).  
Notwithstanding Brazil’s still modest participation in the global production networks -
it mostly trades with its MERCOSUL neighbours-, the country has entered the world’s most 
robust flows in 2014 as a net exporter of value-added to China and a net importer from the US; 






The present work stands as one of the recent empirical contributions to the network analysis of 
the world web of suppliers and users of value-added. It belongs to a new line of the studies that 
represent IO matrices as graphs, as these are now weighted and directed networks, 
simultaneously displaying the different values of supply and use flows among countries or 
countries-sectors.  
From 2000 to 2014, the world’s trade in value-added has more than trebled and its 
geographical spread has become less unequal, with more countries and bilateral flows relevant 
for the GVCs. Countries with a greater number of partners also account for higher values of 
trade in value-added; major suppliers tend to also be major users.  
Most of the countries, however, do not hold meaningful trade relationships or a 
significant number of partners, and their total trade in value-added is still small. Thus, the 
distribution of all centralities parameters is left-skewed.  
When one takes into consideration the importance of partners instead of the value of 
trade, the centralities that emerge highlight that shared borders and trade agreements matter, as 
among Canada, Mexico and the US, or Netherlands with Germany. 
Notwithstanding patterns in the global production networks show a strong regional 
dimension and that geographic borders matter, it is hard to conceive the GVCs phenomenon 
without the initial contracting out trend in the US and the steady industrial capacity of 
Germany. 
The networks associated to the two time-frames here analysed clearly support this point, 
as well as how crucial Asia was, with its virtuous dynamics, combining the evolving roles of 
Japan, South Korea and China (besides less important players, like Vietnam and Thailand, not 
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included in the WIOD). Despite the latter, the US still seems to keep a position of global winner 
from the phenomenon, with the outward flow from China to it slightly higher than the opposite 
flow, as highlighted in section 5. Until at least 2014 -our most recent date-, China was a net 
supplier of value-added to the US, contradicting the informal view the US has been running an 
unfavourable TiVA balance with China.  
The above stresses the importance of departing from network analysis with traditional 
trade statistics as such reversals from so-called common knowledge cannot be identified in 
standard trade in goods flows, leading to unfortunate if not wrong trade policies. 
The GVCs phenomenon remains however, as shown by the distribution of the several 
centrality measures, highly asymmetric, even if a certain diversification of world production 
centres is in course. 
Is the model possible without strong regional hubs enjoying the possibility of linkages 
to other major markets?  
We venture that with only a strictly regional market, or a fully globalised one, GVCs 
would perhaps be unfeasible or, at least, less frequent. The regional hub property provides a 
basis for a process of continuous outsourcing and supply that feeds the growth and upgrading 
of the centre, while the linkages to other major markets add needed more consumers to keep 
and ever-increase scale gains, besides multiplying the fragmentation options. The regional 
dimension is also key for the smaller firms, given the greater impact of transportation and 
logistics costs on them. 
But, at the end of the day, concentration seems to be the name of the game. Without 
Germany, factory Europe loses its pumping engine; the same for Asia without China and, in 
2014, for the whole world, without the US.  
Emerging countries have intensified their positioning in the world trade network from 
2000 to 2014, driven by upping the intensity of previous relationships with the key hubs. Will, 
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following this evolution, China eventually either absorb or dominate the other hubs, becoming 
the new central node of the WTN?  
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Figure III: Total node degree distribution 2000 and 2014 




Figure IV: Total node strength distribution 2000 and 2014 
Source: Authors calculations based on WIOD IO data for 2000 and 2014 
  2000 2014 
Total No of Countries 43 43 
Total No of flows 713 730 
Total value of TTVA (Billion US dollars) 2408,7 6790,7 
Lowest bilateral flow (Billion US dollars) 2,1 7,0 
Highest bilateral trade flow (Billion US dollars) 874,1 1885,2 
Average, TTVA (Billion US dollars) 3,4 9,3 
Median, TTVA (Billion US dollars) 1,0 3,4 
No of countries making up 50% of TTVA 17 23 
No of flows making up 50% of TTVA 45 57 
No of countries making up 90% of TTVA 34 35 
No of flows making up 90% of TTVA 260 316 
% of TTVA belonging to the top 10% flows 61,7% 56,3% 




Table 2: Top 5 and Bottom 5 countries in Indegree and Outdegree Strength  
 






Figure V: Eigenvector centrality distribution 2000 and 2014 




Table 3: Correlation coefficient of centrality measures 
 
  2000 2014 
EC – NS 0,94 0,92 
EC – ND 0,58 0,59 
Source: Authors calculations based on WIOD IO data for 2000 and 2014. Formula for eigenvector centrality 
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USA USA USA USA 
DEU DEU DEU DEU 
FRA CHN JPN CHN 
GBR FRA GBR NLD 





 BGR LTU CYP HRV 
CYP MLT LTU MLT 
LTU EST EST EST 
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Table 4: Eigenvector Centrality rank analysis 
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Source: Authors calculations based on WIOD IO data for 2000 and 2014. Formula for eigenvector centrality 








Figure VI – 2000 world’s supplier and user network cut by the 10% highest flows. Pink nodes represent net importers 








Figure VII – 2014 world’s supplier and user network cut by the 10% highest flows. Pink nodes represent net 












































Figure VIII – 2000 world’s supplier and user regional network. Asia include China, South Korea, Japan, India, 
Indonesia and Taiwan; Europe included all 27 EU countries, plus Switzerland and Norway. NA corresponds to all 3 
NAFTA countries. 
Figure IX – 2000 world’s supplier and user regional network. Asia include China, South Korea, Japan, India, 
Indonesia and Taiwan; Europe included all 27 EU countries, plus Switzerland and Norway. NA corresponds to all 3 
NAFTA countries. 
